Afghanistan remains a hub of jihadist terrorism
Donald Trump and Joe Biden have always agreed on one thing: thanks to the Doha Accords and the Taliban’s promise, Islamist terrorism, at least the kind that worried the US, would no longer be present in Afghanistan. And, since a leopard can’t change its spots, if some small group continued to bother China and Russia, maybe a little “help” could have slipped in.
And never mind if the return of the Taliban meant throwing the Afghan population back into the nightmare, if women would be robbed of their future and the gates of hell would reopen for them, if human rights would become waste paper. Yes, of course, the Accords contained pompous declarations about respect for women and human rights, but what really mattered was that Afghanistan no longer represented a threat to the US. After all, this is why the country has been under occupation for 20 years.
Today we can say that this is proving to be a great illusion, even if the Taliban continue the farce: on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the Doha Agreement last February 28, they declared that they had fulfilled their obligations to prevent terrorist groups from operating in Afghanistan and therefore no longer felt bound by the agreement.
A statement that is in fact denied by the US State Department itself, as can be seen by reading the April 30, 2025 Report by SIGAR (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, an independent body of the United States government, established to monitor and verify how US funds intended for the reconstruction of Afghanistan are spent): “Terrorist groups continued to operate in and from Afghanistan, despite persistent concerns by the United States, the United Nations, and the region that the country remains a haven for terrorists, despite the commitments made by the Taliban in the 2020 Doha Agreement… The State Department stated in its annual report on terrorism, published in December 2024, that “terrorist groups such as the Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) continued to take advantage of poor socioeconomic conditions and irregular security procedures [in Afghanistan] that make the operating environment more difficult. permissive… The State Department also told SIGAR that ‘it is not yet clear whether the Taliban has the will and ability to completely eliminate safe havens for terrorists.’”
And then “him,” the ultimate evil for the US, al-Qaeda: “The Taliban continued to provide a permissive environment for al-Qaeda throughout Afghanistan. The [UN] team’s February report found that al-Qaeda leader Sayf al-Adl’s strategy of ‘reorganizing al-Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan and reactivating sleeper cells in Iraq, Libya, [Syria] and Europe was indicative of the group’s long-term intention to conduct external operations.’”
In its 2025 annual threat assessment, the ODNI (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, a U.S. federal agency whose mission is to coordinate and oversee all U.S. intelligence agencies) noted al-Qaeda’s intention to “target the United States and U.S. citizens through its global affiliates.”
There’s no doubt about it. A great result after 20 years of occupation and having returned Afghanistan to the Taliban. But let’s look in detail at the evidence that shows how Afghanistan is becoming the hub of jihadists.
Friends of al-Qaeda, protected and pampered
The Taliban’s relationship with al-Qaeda is based on a difficult balancing act between maintaining a historic relationship with the ideologically closest terrorist group and international recognition of their alleged fight against terrorism, the first step towards the entry of the so-called Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan into the international community.
As is well known, the close ties with al-Qaeda of the first Taliban regime (1996-2001) and the refuge offered to its leader Osama bin Laden provoked the US attack on Afghanistan after the attacks of September 11, 2001, organized by the terrorist group. Having moved to Pakistan after the fall of the regime, Osama bin Laden was killed on May 6, 2011 during a US military operation, but cells of the organization will continue to be present in Afghanistan.
At the beginning of 2021, US intelligence agencies estimated that al-Qaeda was at an all-time low in Afghanistan, counting less than two hundred members. But a year later, the total number of affiliates in Afghanistan had, according to the UN Security Council, doubled, reaching four hundred fighters, with most of its members based in the provinces of Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimruz, Paktika and Zabul. Since the first months after August 2021, the main leaders of the group have moved to Afghanistan, starting with bin Laden’s successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, thanks to his strong ties with the Taliban, in particular with the powerful “minister” of the interior Sirajuddin Haqqani. And it will be in a house in Haqqani that al-Zawahiri will be killed by US drones in July 2022.
In February 2024, the UN reports that al-Qaeda runs training camps in 8 of the 34 Afghan provinces (according to some sources there are 10 today, including one in Panjshir, a former stronghold of the anti-Taliban Resistance Front) and that the person in charge of these camps is called Hakim al Masri. And the UN report of February 2025 states that “The Taliban maintain a permissive environment that has allowed al-Qaeda to consolidate, thanks to the presence of safe havens and training camps scattered throughout Afghanistan (see chart).
Low-profile members reside with their families under the protection of the Taliban intelligence services in Kabul neighborhoods (for example, Qala-e-Fatullah, Shar-e-Naw and Wazir Akbar Khan), while high-level leaders are located in rural areas outside Kabul (such as the remote village of Bulghuli in Sar-e Pul province), Kunar, Ghazni, Logar and Wardak. Some Member States have reported that Hamza al Ghamdi, a veteran of the organization, is in the Shashdarak maximum security area in Kabul with his family. The Taliban have transferred Abu Ikhlas Al-Masri (arrested around 2013 and released after the return of the Taliban) in a highly secure complex in the Afshar neighborhood of Kabul”.
The relations between the Taliban and the members of al-Qaeda are complex and are articulated on several levels also because, over the thirty years of presence in Afghan territory or in refugee camps in Pakistan, many members of the terrorist organization have married women from Taliban families or close to them. Even the “institutional” relationship with the organization is not monolithic and varies depending on the moment and the individual leaders of the terrorist group, but Afghanistan remains a central strategic hub for al-Qaeda. As demonstrated by the pamphlet published in July 2024 on as-Sahab, the organization’s reference media, attributed to Sayf al-Adl, the name by which the Egyptian citizen Mohammed Salahaldin Abd El Halim Zidane, considered al-Zawahiri’s successor, is known, where it states: “The loyal people of the Ummah [global Islamic community] interested in change must go to Afghanistan, learn from its conditions and benefit from its experience [of the Taliban]”. Al-Adl then states that Muslims should consider the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan as a hero and a model for building future Islamic states.
Statements perfectly in line with what has always been al-Qaeda’s main objective: to establish a pan-Islamic caliphate and overthrow corrupt “apostate” regimes in the Islamic world. To do so, it forms alliances with various terrorist groups, as the SIGAR Report also notes: “Al-Qaeda has continued to expand its reach outside of Afghanistan by strengthening coordination with Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), East Turkestan Islamic Movement/Turkestan Islamic Party (ETIM/TIP), and Jamaat Ansarullah.”
Enemy number 1: ISIS-K
Short for Islamic State – Khorasan Province, ISIS-K is one of the most dangerous and complex jihadist groups in South Asia. Born in 2015, this regional branch of the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) has quickly established itself as a significant security threat not only in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also in the entire Central Asia region. Since June 2020, the organization has been led by Sanaullah Ghafari, an Afghan of Tajik ethnicity also known by the nom de guerre Shahab al-Muhajir, who has transformed ISIS-K into an organization with global ambitions. The group has claimed attacks in several countries, including the most devastating in Russia where, in March 2024, an attack on a concert hall near Moscow caused at least 137 deaths, and in Iran where, in January 2024, a double suicide bombing in Kerman killed almost 100 people during a commemoration for Qassem Soleimani.
The name “Khorasan” refers to a historical region of Central Asia that includes parts of Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and neighboring countries. In the jihadist context, the name has a strong symbolic and apocalyptic value, linked to the belief that from that land the fighters of Islam will be born in the end times.
Founded by former Pakistani Taliban (TTP) militants, al-Qaeda fighters and Afghan Taliban dissidents who have chosen to join the global cause of the Islamic State, distinct from the traditional Taliban. This split marked a turning point in the regional jihadist landscape, leading to a heated and bloody rivalry between the two groups.
As a regional branch of the Islamic State, ISIS-K aims to establish a strict Islamic caliphate based on Sharia law, extending its influence to Afghanistan, Pakistan and beyond. Unlike the Taliban, who have a more national and tribal vision, ISIS-K aims for a global and more radical jihad, also opposing the Taliban who they consider “moderate” and insufficiently rigorous.
Since 2015, ISIS-K has conducted numerous violent and spectacular attacks, characterized by high brutality and a high number of civilian casualties. Among the most tragic episodes, in addition to the two already mentioned abroad, stands out the suicide attack of August 26, 2021 at Kabul airport, which caused over 180 deaths, including thirteen US soldiers, during the evacuation of foreign forces and Afghan civilians. ISIS-K has particularly targeted Shiite religious minorities, such as the Hazara, organizing attacks against mosques, schools and markets, as well as operations against the Taliban themselves.
The main base of ISIS-K remains eastern Afghanistan, especially in the mountainous provinces of Nangarhar and Kunar, where Taliban forces have difficulty fully controlling the territory. In addition to Kabul, ISIS-K has tried to expand into other Afghan provinces and has operational cells in Pakistan, particularly in the tribal regions of Waziristan and Baluchistan. The group has also sought to extend its influence in Central Asia, in countries such as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, exploiting porous borders and local political fragilities. And it is precisely this jihadist “mixture” that represents a strong point of ISIS-K which, as the UN explains, is “cunningly using Afghan nationals to conduct attacks in Pakistan, Pakistani nationals to conduct attacks inside Afghanistan, Tajik nationals to conduct attacks in Iran (Islamic Republic of Iran) and the Russian Federation and has used a Kyrgyz national to carry out an attack in the heart of the Taliban, Kandahar”. Far from having “pacified” the country, not only are the Taliban unable to protect Afghan citizens from ISIS-K terrorist attacks, but the terrorist group has also “benefited from the Taliban’s inability to protect itself from infiltration and corruption within its own ranks, despite raids to arrest disloyal officials,” according to the UN Report of February 2025.
The Pakistani Brothers of the TTP
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known as the Pakistani Taliban, is a Sunni jihadist coalition formed in 2007 with the stated goal of overthrowing the government of Pakistan and establishing an Islamic emirate based on Sharia law. Over time, the group has become a major threat to Pakistan’s security, responsible for some of the bloodiest attacks in its recent history.
Founded by Baitullah Mehsud, an influential tribal commander in the South Waziristan region, along with other militant leaders active along the tribal area on the Afghan-Pakistan border, TTP was born in response to military operations launched by the Pakistani army against groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, who enjoyed safe havens in the tribal areas.
The movement took ideological inspiration from the Afghan Taliban, but is structurally and operationally independent from them, pursuing specific objectives: the establishment of Islamic law in Pakistan; the end of Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States and the West; revenge against the Pakistani army for its operations in the tribal areas and for supporting the US war on terror.
Since its founding, the TTP has conducted hundreds of bombings, suicide attacks and ambushes against military, government and civilian targets, going through various phases of decline and resurgence. The death of Baitullah Mehsud in a US drone strike in 2009 was followed by internal leadership struggles; in 2018, Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud was appointed as the new leader. Under his leadership, the group has sought to reorganize, improve communication, and exploit sectarian and ethnic divisions in the country. The return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan has provided the TTP with new logistical and operational opportunities, strengthening its presence on the border.
Although the Afghan Taliban have formally denied supporting the TTP, it is known and reported by several international bodies that many TTP leaders are taking refuge in Afghanistan and are being protected. The Global Terrorism Index 2025 found that TTP attacks have increased five-fold since the Taliban’s return to power. Pakistan has repeatedly asked Kabul to extradite members of the group, but without success. According to the aforementioned SIGAR Report, in the second half of 2024 there would have been increased collaboration between the TTP, the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda, with attacks conducted under the auspices of Tehrik-e Jihad Pakistan, an umbrella organization. Finally, according to SIGAR, the TTP has established new training centers in the Afghan provinces of Kunar, Nangarhar, Khost and Paktika, has expanded recruitment to include Afghan Taliban members, and has received financial support from the Taliban regime.
Finally, the aforementioned ODNI warns: “The TTP’s capabilities, historical ties to al-Qaeda and previous support for operations against the United States raise concerns about the potential future threat.”
Small Terrorists Grow
If those described are the main organizations that are growing stronger in Afghanistan, they are not the only ones: “Terrorist groups continued to use Afghan soil to train and plan attacks and a “small but steady” flow of foreign terrorists continued to travel to Afghanistan and join one of the more than two dozen terrorist groups based there”, reads the UN Report of February 2025.
Let’s just say that there is an embarrassment of choice and, above all, in addition to the United States and the West in general, even neighboring countries cannot sleep soundly. Just to name a few groups: the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), is a Uyghur group, therefore particularly disliked by China, with historical ties to the Taliban; Katibat Imam al-Bukhari and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) are Uzbek groups, linked to the Taliban and al-Qaeda; as for Pakistan, we do not only have the TTP, but also Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), which also have historical ties to the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
There is one last, but not secondary, element to consider. In Afghanistan, the school system is being dismantled and religious subjects in a fundamentalist key are largely replacing other subjects. The report published by UNAMA in April highlights how the transformation of the country’s public education system into a religious model based on madrasas is underway. In September 2024, the de facto government’s Ministry of Education announced an increase in Islamic education centers to 21,257, of which 19,669 are madrasas, exceeding the total number of public and private schools, equal to 18,337. All this can only lead to a radicalization of the younger generations with the growth of new militants who may be even more dangerous than the current Taliban are perceived.