Doha. Technical meetings, innocuous gestures: this is how the Taliban’s legitimacy advances quietly.

The latest edition of the “Doha Process” concluded without any surprises: the parties reiterated previously expressed positions, with no openness from the Taliban regarding human rights and inclusiveness, nor any signs of concession or official recognition from the UN.

The lack of an official joint declaration with the Taliban at the end of the meetings is unsurprising: the only area of ​​convergence was the technical roundtable on the fight against drugs, which concluded on February 4th with an agreement limited to satisfaction with the Taliban’s declared reduction in poppy production. They also stated without hesitation that the synthetic drug that has now flooded world markets would not be produced in Afghanistan.

UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs and Peacebuilding, Rosemary DiCarlo, traveled to Kabul this time to meet with the Taliban as part of the continuation of the UN-led international dialogue for interaction between the Taliban, the UN, and the international community, known as Doha 3.

In particular, she met with Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi and Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, as well as diplomats in Kabul, representatives of Afghan civil society, and women working for the United Nations.

UNAMA, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, issued a statement reaffirming its continued diplomatic engagement and dialogue within the framework of the “Doha Process.” The text also states that Rosemary DiCarlo expressed deep concern about the restrictions imposed on women in Afghanistan, particularly limitations on access to education, employment, and participation in public life, as well as the ban on female Afghan personnel working for the United Nations. DiCarlo therefore urged the Taliban authorities to immediately revoke these measures and to respect the fundamental rights of women and girls.

Furthermore, she urged the Taliban to remove all obstacles to the passage of humanitarian assistance and to cooperate with UN agencies to ensure that aid reaches populations in need without interference. She then reiterated the need to maintain open and operational diplomatic dialogue within the framework of the “Doha Process,” urging the Taliban’s active participation, particularly in the technical working groups on counternarcotics and the private sector. She described continued dialogue as beneficial to all stakeholders involved in Afghanistan’s future, and called on the Taliban to fulfill their international obligations.

Finally, he confirmed his intention to convene a fourth meeting of the Doha Process, but without granting formal political legitimacy to the Taliban.

For their part, sources report that Muttaqi reaffirmed his government’s political actions, focusing in particular on the security measures adopted and the management of refugees. He also reiterated his call for the United Nations to work towards the lifting of banking sanctions imposed on Afghanistan and to facilitate the release of Afghan assets frozen by the US.

A Stalemate

The negotiations now appear to be at a standstill. It’s fair to ask who still truly believes in negotiations and who still considers them an effective tool for influencing the Taliban’s political choices. Certainly not Russia, which has already recognized the Taliban government; Nor do India, China, and other countries in the region and the Middle East, which have opened diplomatic channels with Kabul without ever prioritizing the recognition of women’s rights or government inclusiveness as a prerequisite for establishing economic and political relations with the de facto executive.

But skepticism does not seem to be limited to these actors. Over the past year, some European countries and the European Union itself have gradually, more or less openly, sought direct dialogue and diplomatic outreach to the Taliban, primarily with the aim of curbing migration flows. Similarly, the United States, while publicly claiming a funding freeze to avoid indirectly supporting a regime considered terrorist, has nevertheless initiated contacts and agreements with the Taliban to secure the release and exchange of prisoners.

All these unilateral initiatives suggest that many countries have little faith in the ability of the Doha Process and the Peace Mosaic to influence the Taliban’s decisions, pushing them toward openness on rights and democracy. The recent introduction of the Taliban Penal Code, which institutionalizes slavery, caste division, and the rejection of any religion or faith other than the Hanafi interpretation, represents a further blow to the Taliban’s hopes of moderating fundamentalism.

Also the UNAMA’s ability to “promote the objective of a secure, stable, prosperous, and inclusive Afghanistan” through dialogue with the ruling authorities and the management of humanitarian assistance, as envisioned in the Independent Assessment commissioned by the Security Council and which, since December 2023, has become the guiding principle for the UN political strategy for Afghanistan, remains deeply questioned, even among Council members themselves, who are advancing proposals for change.

Meanwhile, however, the mechanism continues unabated: the wagon train continues, and there is already talk of organizing the Doha 4 summit in Kabul. Even without official recognition of the Taliban government, the step toward de facto legitimacy appears to be edging ever closer.

Soft Recognition

While pressure is mounting to hold the Taliban and their government accountable for their actions, and just recently, UN Human Rights Council experts have called on states to give a voice to Afghan women and actively support the inclusion of the crime of gender apartheid in the Treaty on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Humanity, which will enter a crucial phase in the coming months, Western “democratic” states and the EU are instead proceeding in small diplomatic steps toward a dangerous de facto recognition.

This is happening through the normalization of contacts and seemingly “technical” interactions: multiplying business meetings, insignificant protocol gestures, official images, and operational practices that, with time and repetition, take on more weight than official declarations. A sequence of minor and seemingly neutral gestures that override the verbal caution diplomats hide behind.

It’s a soft acknowledgement, so it doesn’t alarm politicians—always distracted by other emergencies—or international public opinion, which isn’t informed by the media and doesn’t perceive it as a scandal. A deliberately ambiguous management of relations, which ends up producing substantial political effects without anyone seeming to notice.