A black screen, because showing one’s face is too dangerous. Fictional names, because one’s identity must remain hidden. And then the connection drops, only to resume shortly afterward from a different computer or phone: staying connected for too long on the same device could be risky. It was under these conditions that the press conference organized by CISDA with RAWA activists took place. Distant voices, hidden behind a screen, but young and combative, who on the sad anniversary of the Taliban’s return to power, wanted to speak to the Italian press. To describe what it means to live in Afghanistan today. And, above all, what it means to be a woman in Afghanistan.
Summing up the condition of Afghan women is as simple as it is dramatic. Women cannot work, cannot study, cannot sing, cannot look out of the window, cannot show themselves, cannot seek medical treatment, cannot go to public parks, cannot open shops, cannot ride bicycles, cannot speak out loud. “Cannot” is the word most frequently associated with the word “woman” in Afghanistan.
“Women are excluded from the world of work and public life: their movements, their clothing, and even their presence in society are controlled. And it’s not a matter of a few individual impositions, but of systematic segregation… that’s why we must talk about gender apartheid. It’s the systematic exclusion and control of women, simply because they are women,” began one of the RAWA activists connected from Afghanistan.
Technology Supports Repression
It was August 15, 2021, when media outlets around the world broadcast the images of Kabul airport being stormed by hundreds of people attempting to board the planes of fleeing Americans. Five years later, it’s not just the repression that remains: according to RAWA activists, the regime has learned to make it more widespread, also exploiting increasingly sophisticated technological tools.
“The Taliban haven’t changed. The only thing that has changed is that they’ve become more ruthless. Furthermore, they have financial support and access to technology: through this access, they can control people’s lives,” said the RAWA activist, explaining how purchasing a SIM card can only be done by presenting an electronic identity card, which provides all the information, including biometrics, of the cardholder. “When there’s a demonstration, like the recent ones in Herat or Badakhshan, the Taliban ask telecommunications companies to provide them with the numbers of SIM cards found at the demonstration site.” From there, arresting those participating in protests is a breeze.
The phone, thus, ceases to be a neutral tool and becomes a potential source of danger: “When we use our phones, when we talk, when we connect, we are never at peace because the Taliban have access to everything. The Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice uses the internet to listen to the voices of people speaking out on specific issues.”
Control doesn’t stop at surveillance. It can quickly escalate to arrest, interrogation, and intimidation: dozens and dozens of people disappear for days or weeks, held accountable for what they said, wrote, or did. Even a sentence that doesn’t perfectly align with the regime’s dictates can become a crime.
The Taliban’s hands are reaching out greedily.
But control doesn’t just come from digital tools. It extends to daily life, work, humanitarian aid, even emergencies.
Afghanistan is a land devastated not only by wars and the Taliban regime, but also by adverse weather conditions, alternating periods of severe drought with heavy rains and floods, and by frequent earthquakes. It is precisely in the most fragile situations that, according to RAWA, the regime once again shows its inhumane side, making the lives of women and children even more difficult: “During the last earthquake in Herat province, for example, one of our health teams that went there found several women still under the rubble of their homes,” the RAWA activist explained. Their fault? Not having male relatives to care for them.
And even when aid arrives, control remains. According to the activists, the regime’s men try to profit from disasters by demanding bribes or confiscating medicines brought by NGOs and then redistributing them according to criteria in which women systematically come after men: “In Paktia, one of the affected areas, some RAWA volunteers were forced to deliver medicines to local Taliban forces. They ordered the health workers: ‘First examine and treat the men, then you can take care of the women’.”
Money, moreover, seems to be another tool through which the Taliban exerts power over the population. “If you try to sell something on the street, you have to pay a fee to the Taliban.” They call them taxes, but according to RAWA, they are actually bribes: they are not imposed by the regulated tax system, and the amounts demanded vary from case to case. Those who work on the streets, such as street vendors or outdoor tailors, are also constantly exposed to blackmail: they can be forced to report suspicious movements or alleged violations of codes of conduct to avoid arrest, closure of the business, or a new demand for money.
Corruption even reaches private ceremonies. During engagements and weddings, activists say, regime men can show up at the hotel or the venue and demand money. Only after payment can the party continue.
The same mechanism involves NGOs trying to support the population: “There are people within the Taliban government who do just this: when the organization goes to the relevant ministry for project approval, they are intercepted by these people who demand a certain amount of money to ensure the project is approved.”
But there’s a limit that, RAWA explains, not even money can overcome: that of projects aimed at women. “A person who works in one of these organizations told us they were preparing a proposal for a project aimed at women, but the government forced them to replace the word ‘woman’ with ‘family.'” Even the word “woman” is unpronounceable in official documents, unless it involves prohibitions.
Normalization, the Taliban’s mantra
Yet, while control inside Afghanistan becomes increasingly pervasive, outside the regime pursues a seemingly opposite goal: to gain acceptance, to become normal.
The most popular word in Afghanistan, according to RAWA, is precisely this: normalization.
Not just the normalization of repression, of the rules imposed daily to women and restrictions on freedom, but also normalization of relations with the rest of the world.
We are indeed witnessing a progressive normalization of international relations. The most obvious example is Russia, which in July 2025 officially recognized the Taliban government, becoming the first state to do so. China follows closely behind, maintaining a more cautious position formally, but has long maintained diplomatic and economic relations with Kabul, including trade and cooperation in investment and reconstruction. Other countries, such as India, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and others, are no exception.
The United Nations, however, is characterized by an intermediate situation. The UN does not recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan and continues to define them as the de facto authorities, but maintains an ongoing dialogue with them through UNAMA and the Doha Process. The European Union follows a similar line: it does not recognize the Taliban regime, but maintains an operational relationship with the de facto authorities, both for humanitarian aid and regarding migration and the repatriation of Afghans.
This is a contradiction only Apparent: the regime is not formally recognized, but negotiations are conducted with those who control the territory. And precisely this gap between lack of recognition and de facto relations offers the Taliban the opportunity to increasingly present themselves as a normal interlocutor, as the government with which, like it or not, the rest of the world must deal.
Normalization, however, doesn’t just happen through governments. It also happens through videos.
Alongside relations with states and discussions with international organizations, according to RAWA, intense social media activity is underway: dozens of videos on YouTube, Facebook, and TikTok show tourists strolling peacefully through the streets of Kabul or visiting Band-e Amir National Park. “There’s even a video circulating of a woman happily dancing with a man in a mountainous area. But they’re fake. These videos are meant to show that security in Afghanistan is excellent or that life is normal and peaceful. In reality, these YouTubers are paid by the Taliban to show an Afghanistan that doesn’t exist: they only talk about food, picnic spots, or tourist spots. None of these videos talk about poverty or violence against women”.
This is the other side of normalization: not just obtaining diplomatic relations, trade, or international dialogue, but building an image of the country in which repression disappears from view.
According to RAWA, this too is part of a larger project to normalize the Taliban regime.
They normalize the various rules imposed daily against women, against children, against the entire Afghan people.
But protests do exist: explicit or clandestine
Yet, beneath this apparent normality, something continues to stir.
A segment of the Afghan population is rebelling, either publicly or through clandestine resistance.
Despite the repression, protests have not disappeared. Such is the case in Badakhshan, a province in northern Afghanistan, where the population has organized public demonstrations against the Taliban and their regime: “The Taliban are fighting against the residents of Badakhshan because they profess a different religion, Ismailism, and are trying to force them to convert,” explains the RAWA activist. A few weeks ago, an armed opposition group managed to gain control of the district, albeit only temporarily, but ordinary people have also organized demonstrations. And the same thing happened in Herat province, in the Jebrail area, populated mostly by Hazaras: “Amr al-Ma’ruf’s forces, the morality police, arrested several women in this area because of their ‘non-compliant’ hijab. The population then protested, demonstrating for the release of these women.”
But the rebellion isn’t just the visible one in the demonstrations, which are always harshly repressed. It’s also the invisible one of clandestinity, of the daily work of organizations like RAWA: “If we want to continue our work, we must be stronger than those in power. And the way to be stronger and preserve the members of our organization is, at this time, to wage clandestine struggles.”
This clandestinity allows us to bring the voice of Afghanistan and Afghan women abroad, to continue to provide education through clandestine schools, and to provide assistance to an increasingly exhausted population.
It’s difficult and dangerous work. The Taliban constantly seek out those who organize these activities, those who work against them: “They monitor social media to identify activists, and even walking the streets with a phone in your hand can be risky: if they stop you, they’ll check it,” and if they find anything they don’t like, they’re immediately arrested.
But herein lies the greatest contradiction in this seemingly normalized Afghanistan: while the regime tries to present itself to the world as a stable partner, inside the country it continues to repress anyone who questions its vision of society.
The women of RAWA and the other organizations with which CISDA works are undaunted. They stubbornly continue to work so that Afghan girls and young women are granted a future. A responsibility that, even for those observing from afar, means, first and foremost, not letting that voice disappear.